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NOTES
TAXPAYER'S RECORDS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT-THE DEMISE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION

The Internal Revenue Service directed a summons to petitioner's
accountant to produce certain records and documents in his possession. Petitioner was undisputedly owner of the materials. In judicial
proceedings to enforce the summons, petitioner intervened to bar
enforcement, relying on the fifth amendment.' The United States
Supreme Court held the fifth amendment ineffective to prevent pro-

duction of petitioner's papers in possession of her accountant. Couch
v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 611 (1973).
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to examine books, records, and
other relevant data, and to issue summonses for the purpose of ascertaining the tax liability of any person.' Section 7604 provides the
United States district courts with jurisdiction to compel production
of materials and to enforce summonses.A To enhance the use of these
sections, the Supreme Court in Donaldson v. United States4 held that
an Internal Revenue summons could be utilized to aid investigations
of a criminal nature, provided issuance be "in good faith and prior
to a recommendation for criminal prosecution."

5

The individual taxpayer' may invoke the fifth amendment to
prevent compulsory production of his private papers so long as he is
1. The petitioner further contended that enforcement of the summons would violate her fourth amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Court accepted the government's argument that the contention did "not appear to be
independent of her Fifth Amendment argument." Couch v. United States, 93 S. Ct.
611 n.6 (1973).
See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), where the Supreme Court held
that the Internal Revenue could secure enforcement of a summons without meeting
the standard of probable cause.
2. For a general discussion of the Internal Revenue summons, see Comment,
N.Y.U. 27TH INST. ON FED. TAX 1383 (1969).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604.

4. 400 U.S. 517 (19711). It is notcworthy that the Court in Donaldson rejected the
dicta of Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) that a taxpayer could intervene as of
right just because it is his tax liability under investigation.
5. 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971).
6. The privilege against self-incrimination is personal in nature and may not be
invoked by a corporation or association. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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both owner and possessor.7 If, however, the taxpayer's papers are
summoned while in a third party's possession," it is generally held
that the owner may not bar production on fifth amendment grounds.'
Nonetheless, a showing of constructive possession may enable the
nonpossessing taxpayer to successfully assert his constitutional privilege."' Constructive possession may be present where an individual
possesses papers on behalf of the taxpayer, but ultimate control and
disposition of the materials remain with the taxpayer. For example,
the courts have upheld a claim of constructive possession where materials are in possession of a bailee for safekeeping, II held by an attorney on behalf of the taxpayer, 2 and placed in another's possession
for convenience of the Internal Revenue Service. Thus, in United
States v. Tsukuno 4 the district court refused enforcement of a summons to the taxpayer's accountant, holding taxpayer intervenor could
validly invoke his fifth amendment privilege to prevent production
of papers owned by him but in possession of his agent.
7. See Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969), and the cases cited
therein. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8. Formerly uncertainty existed when materials owned by a third party are in
actual possession of the taxpayer. This situation typically arises when the accountant
turns over his work product to the taxpayer, often just prior to issuance of a summons.
Some cases have held that after commencement of an investigation, transfer of an
accountant's work product will not change possession. United States v. Widelski, 452
F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Zakutansky, 401 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969). See also United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir.
1972); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961). Following this reasoning the taxpayer
may not invoke his constitutional privilege, as he is considered to have neither
ownership nor possession of the papers. However, in United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d
464 (9th Cir. 1967), taxpayer successfully asserted his fifth amendment privilege in
resisting production of his accountant's workpapers transferred to his possession prior
to summons. The court reasoned that taxpayer's actual possession rather than his
ownership of the incriminating materials was sufficient to support the privilege. But
see United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir.
1959). Since the Couch opinion, the above conflict appears to have been settled in favor
of the Cohen rationale.
9. United States v. Bowman, 236 F. Supp. 548 (M.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d
421 (3d Cir. 1966). See generally United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); In re
Magnus, 299 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1962).
10. See Donaldson v. United States, 418 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1969); Comment, 38
BROOKLYN

L.

REV.

130 (1971).

11. United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956).
12. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). But see United States
v. White, 31 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 73-1151 (5th Cir. 1973).
13. Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1969).
14. 341 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Ill. 1972). But see United States v. Schoeberlein, 335
F. Supp. 1048 (D. Md. 1971).
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It appears from the majority opinion in Couch that a taxpayer,
by placing business records in possession of an accountant for a long
and continuous period of time, may not bar enforcement of an Internal Revenue summons directed to the accountant. The Couch decision may have far-reaching implications.' 5 Although disclaiming any
intention to establish a "per se rule," it seems that with minor exception'" the Court made actual possession a necessary element in order
to invoke the fifth amendment privilege. Moreover, it was made clear
that no accountant-client privilege exists in federal law. In addition,
the Court concluded that "there can be little expectation of privacy,"
with respect to records kept for tax purposes.7
Relying on the fourth and fifth amendments, the Supreme Court
in Boyd v. United States'" had previously held that "any forcible and
15. See United States v. White, note 12 supra. In White the Fifth Circuit, relying
on the Couch opinion, held that the privilege against self-incrimination afforded no
protection to a taxpayer in regard to workpapers of his accountant in possession of the
taxpayer's attorney. The court stated that "[tihe lesson to be drawn from Couch,
then, is that unless the taxpayer is actually in possession of documents sought by the
government-or clearly has constructive possession-he will be unable to seek the
shelter of the fifth amendment because he will not be the object of. . .compulsion."
16. The Court offered the following exception to the rule of actual possession:
"where constructive possession is so clear or the relinquishment of possession is so
temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused
substantially intact." 93 S. Ct. 611, 618 (1973). Mr. Justice Marshall dissented on the
basis that the Court "seems to create a bright-line rule that no constitutional right of
petitioner is violated by enforcing a summons of papers not in her possession." Id. at
623. But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan, who joined the majority
"on the understanding that it does rot establish a per se rule defeating a claim of Fifth
Amendment privilege whenever the documents in question are not in the possession
of the person claiming the privilege." Id. at 620. By virtue of the narrow exception
contemplated in the majority opinion, it appears that for all practical purposes actual
possession is a required element.
17. The Couch opinion offered the broad conclusion that "there can be little
expectation of privacy . . .where obligations of disclosure exists." Justice Marshall
in his dissent asserted that "privileged or not, a disclosure to an accountant is rather
close Ito] disclosure to an attorney." The Court's use of such language as "mandatory
disclosure" is reminiscent of the decision in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948). In Shapiro, the Court held that records required to be kept for governmental
examination under the Emergency Price Control Act fall outside of the fifth amendment privilege. The Couch majority opinion makes no mention of Shapiro, but implications from the majority opinion may invite the Internal Revenue to urge application
of the doctrine to income tax records. This war emergency measure should not be
permitted to filter into the tax record area. See Stuart v. United States, 416 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1969); Beard v. United States, 222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
846 (1955).
18. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Boyd involved an attempt by the government to
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compulsory extortion of a man's . . .private papers to be used as

evidence to convict him" violates his constitutional rights. The
Couch majority found the "pre-income tax" opinion of Boyd "did not
. . .address or contemplate the divergence of ownership and posses-

sion."'' The instant opinion relied on the decision of Perlman v.
United States2" for the proposition that compulsion and not ownership is the standard of the fifth amendment privilege. In situations
where there exists divergence of possession and ownership, only the
direct object of the compulsion may invoke the privilege, and then
only if the materials may tend to incriminate him.
The apparent rationale of the Couch decision is that the summoning of papers in possession of an accountant exerts no compulsion on the taxpayer. However, recent judicial language could well
have supported a contrary result. Dicta from a Fifth Circuit opinion
affirmed by the Supreme Court offers the view that "the courts have
deemed" the accountant's possession of the taxpayer's papers "as if
they were in the possession of the taxpayer."'" Thus, the element of
compulsion would exist.2 2 The Couch majority apparently felt that
compel a defendant partner to produce an invoice to be used against him in a forfeiture
proceeding. "ilt was assumed without discussion that an invoice for goods being
imported by a partnership was the private paper of the defendant partner." Comment,
U. So. CAL. 10TH TAX INST. 579, 585 (1958).
19, 93 S. Ct.. 611, 617 (1973),
20. 247 U.S. 7 (1918). In Perlman, a corporate president introduced published
exhibits in a patent infringement suit on behalf of the corporation. These exhibits were
subsequently impounded by the court and the government sought possession for use
against the president for perjury. The Supreme Court rejected the president's claim
that transfer to the government of the exhibits owned by him would violate his fifth
amendment privilege. As mentioned in Couch, the Perlman Court stated "the criterion
of immunity lwas] not the ownership of the property but the 'physical or moral
compulsion' exerted," The Court in Perlman also recognized that "Perlman delivered
the exhibits to publicity .... " 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918). "IH-e claims the same sanctuary for the exhibits as though they were in his hands and had never been published
or delivered to the world." Id. at 13. In light of the factual differences, the majority's
reliance on Perlman may not be totally warranted. A corporate president's published
materials in possession of a court clerk appears distinguishable from records of a
taxpayer in possession of an accountant.
21. Donaldson v. United States, 418 F.2d 1213, 1214 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 400 U.S.
517 (1971).
22. As Judge McLaren stated in United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839, 842
(E.D. Ill.
1972), "Ilin asmuch as a taxpayer's privilege against self-incrimination
extends to refusing to produce records in his own possession, it makes little sense to
say that he has waived it by placing the records in the possession of an agent . . .a
person's Fifth Amendment rights are not so lacking in substance that they disappear
if'
a government agency can locate and subject to process records temporarily out of
his immediate possession." (Emphasis added.) It is noteworthy that the Couch major-
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such a result would "interfere with the legitimate interest '23of society
in enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues.
In light of the Couch opinion, taxpayers and accountants alike
will have to re-evaluate present practices. Written agreements that
ownership of all materials shall remain with the taxpayer, and that
possession by the accountant is only temporary, may prove helpful.2"
Moreover, the accountant should return all materials to the taxpayer
immediately after his services are completed. Perhaps arranging the
performance of the accountant's service on the taxpayer's business
premises will avoid the Couch issue. The need for assistance in so
complex a tax structure coupled with the right to be secure in one's
private dealings with confidants, must be accorded its proper weight
in balancing the interest of maintaining a consistent flow of revenue
with our deeply rooted notion of governmental fair play.
T. Victor Jackson

VERBAL ABUSE AND THE AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE

An argument arose between plaintiff and defendant. When defendant warned plaintiff not to use profanity in front of his wife,
plaintiff replied that she heard worse every day from the defendant.
As a result defendant struck plaintiff, who sustained injuries. The
Louisiana supreme court held, words alone could not justify the striking, although they could be considered in mitigation of damages.
Morneau v. American Oil Co., 272 So. 2d 313 (La. 1973).
One of the curiosities of Louisiana tort law has been the so-called
"aggressor" doctrine. The rule is said to be that "one who is himself
in fault cannot recover damages for a wrong resulting from such fault,
although the party inflicting the injury was not justifiable under the
laws."' Thus recovery has been denied in suits for assault and battery
where the plaintiff was found to have provoked the incident, even
though the conduct of the defendant was not self-defense. Sufficient
provocation has been held to include, in addition to acts of physical
violence, "insults, abuse, threats, or other conduct calculated to
ity opinion stressed the fact that the accountant was not the taxpayer's employee, but
was an independent contractor.
23. 93 S. Ct. 611, 620 (1973).
24. See United States v. Re, 313 F. Supp. 442, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1. Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710, 711 (1876).
2. Fontenelle v. Waguespack, 150 La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922).

